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ABSTRACT
Amongst  other  goals,  this  paper  aims  to  address  complexities  and  challenges  faced  by 
regulators in identifying and assessing risk, problems arising from different perceptions of 
risk, and solutions aimed at countering problems of risk regulation.  It will approach these 
issues through an assessment of explanations put forward to justify the growing importance of 
risks,  well  known  risk  theories  such  as  cultural  theory,  risk  society  theory  and 
governmentality  theory.  In  addressing  the  problems  posed  as  a  result  of  the  difficulty  in 
quantifying risks, it will consider means whereby risks can be quantified reasonably without 
the consequential effects which result from the dual nature of risk, that is, risks emanating 
from the management of institutional risks. 
“Socio cultural” explanations which relate to how risk is increasingly becoming embedded in 
organisations and institutions will also be considered as part of those factors attributable to 
why the  financial  environment  has become transformed to  the state  in  which it  currently 
exists.
A consideration of regulatory developments which have contributed to a change in the way 
financial  regulation  is  carried  out,  an  illustration  of  how  the  financial  industry  and  the 
approach to financial  regulation  have been transformed by the rapid growth of the hedge 
funds industry, will also constitute focal points of the paper.
Key Words: risk, financial, regulation, audit, governmentality theory, risk society, cultural 
theory, hedge funds.
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FINANCIAL REGULATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT: ADDRESSING 
RISK CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Marianne Ojo
Introduction
“Different explanations have been given as to why risk has become central across regulatory 
and governmental circles and these explanations are partly influenced by different approaches 
as  to  what  risk  is.1 One view in  attempting  to  account  for  risk as  a  strategic  organising 
principle in the public sector, attributes the specific needs of government.2 Political scientists, 
however suggest that the adoption of the language and practices of risk reflects a deeper, more 
complex  process,  one  of  “political  isomorphism”.3 According  to  this  view,  risk  becomes 
accepted and embedded in one organisation or institution such that it  acquires recognition 
within other organisations and institutions.4 Other explanations, mainly from socio-cultural 
disciplines  suggest  that  the  importance  of  risk  derives  from  issues  related  to  control, 
accountability, responsibility and blame in late modern society.”5 
Two well-known theoretical perspectives addressing these are termed “risk society” theory 
and “governmentality” theory.6 The “risk society” approach is one that identifies broad socio-
economic  and political  changes  which occurred in late  modern  societies.  Alongside these 
changes, loss of faith in institutions and authorities and a greater awareness of the limits and 
uncertainties linked to science and technology are identified.7 “The term “governmentality” 
refers  to  specific  types  of  government  that  have  arisen  in  modern  societies  in  line  with 
liberalist and neo-liberalist approaches.8 It focuses on the exploration of how the identification 
of risks associated with certain behaviour or activities provide a way of exercising control 
over populations, groups or individuals in neo-liberal societies – in other words, identifying 
how risk is used as a “tool of governance” to shape behaviours.”9
The structure of this paper will accord with the above mentioned points. The paper therefore 
commences with a discussion based the first explanation of risk as an organizing principle. It 
will then consider the second view which will focus on how risk has become embedded in 
regulation – such process having taken place in two ways, namely,  through a “quantitative 
1 Gray J and Hamilton J Implementing Financial Regulation ( 2006) 5
2 Ibid p 5
3 ibid
4 Ibid 
5Ibid  p 5;  also see Bennett  T ‘Culture and Governmentality’  in  McCarthy C and Packer  J  (eds)  Foucault,  
Cultural  Studies  and  Governmentality (2003)  State  University  of  New  York  Press  at  page  47;  Dean  M, 
Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999) London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage 1999 and 
Douglas M, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992) Routledge 
6 See Beck U,  Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications and Foucault M, 
‘Governmentality’ in G Burchell et al (eds),  The Foucault Effect at pages 87-104, also Bratich J, Packer J and 
McCarthy C Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality (2003) State University of New York Press
7 See Gray Jand Hamilton J Implementing Financial Regulation ( 2006) 6; also see Hood C, Rothstein H and 
Baldwin R The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk (2001) Oxford University Press
8 Gray Jand Hamilton J at p 9
9 ibid
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expansion” and through a “qualitative shift towards the management of institutional risks:”10 
Other  explanations  which  have  promulgated  a  focus  on  internal  controls  within  financial 
organisations and institutions, namely such failures such as Barings, will also be considered. 
This will include a consideration of how internal controls have become transformed to risk 
management.  These  “socio  cultural”  explanations  also  relate  to  how  risk  is  increasingly 
becoming embedded in organisations and institutions. The paper will then proceed to consider 
two theories, namely, the “risk society” theory and “governmentality”theory. A consideration 
of these theories will also pave way for the discussion on why difficulties in identifying and 
assessing  risk  have  arisen  and  the  solutions  which  have  been  proposed  to  counter  such 
difficulties. In so doing it will facilitate a consideration of attempts by governments, and the 
EU in particular, to address risk challenges in the final section.
As well as a consideration of regulatory developments which have contributed to a change in 
the way financial regulation is carried out, the final section of the paper will also illustrate 
how the financial industry and the approach to financial regulation has been transformed by 
the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry.
1.1 Definitions attributed to Risk
Risks can be defined as “ the probabilities of physical harm due to given technological or 
other processes.”11 Three observations are noteworthy, namely:12  Firstly that social systems 
serve  as  environments  in  which  such  physical  risks  are  always  created  and given  effect; 
secondly,  as  a  result,  the  degree  of  physical  risks  and  the  quality  of  social  relations  are 
directly related and; thirdly, that primary risk constitutes “social dependency upon institutions 
and actors” and that accessibility by most people affected by stated risks, to such institutions 
and actors, may be virtually impossible. 
Risk  is  also  considered  to  be  the  difference  between  one’s  perception  and  another’s 
perception. According to Douglas13, results from risk research have revealed that “the public” 
does not perceive risks in a similar way to experts. The difference between lay and expert 
opinion has resulted in “a whole new sub-branch of the psychology of risk.”14 In Warner’s 
view,  risk  can  be  regarded  as  “threat  or  danger  whose  perception  will  depend  on  the 
prevailing culture in which there are four major groups: hierarchists, egalitarians, fatalists and 
individualists.”15
Another definition of risk which is quite general, and which considers it to be the probability 
of a certain adverse event occurring during a defined time period or resulting from a specific 
challenge,  draws distinctions between different types of risks – according to whether such 
risks are probabilistic or unpredictable.16
10   See Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 92
11  Beck U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications at page 4
12  ibid
13  Douglas M, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992) Routledge at page 11
14  ibid
15  See Warner F, ‘Calculated Risks’ (1993) Science and Public Affairs at page 45
16  see Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 138
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Problems associated with the definition and assessment of Risk
According  to  Baldwin  and  Cave,  the  first  challenge  faced  by  regulators  concerns  the 
identification of risks that should be limited, not only according to a prioritised order, but in 
such a way which accords with public approval.17In their view, problems are evident due to 
the fact  that  issues accorded priority by the public may seem irrational to those accorded 
priority by experts.18 Within such a context, risk is considered to be multi dimensional and 
incapable of being reduced to simply a product of probability and consequences.19 The second 
regulatory challenge involves the management and regulation of risks in a manner which is 
effective and acceptable – particularly the stage during which intervention should occur.20
Whilst Michael Power considers the more challenging issue as comprising of the management 
and limitation of the expansion of secondary risk management,21in Juul Andersen’s view, the 
existence of tight coupling makes risk in complex systems very difficult -if not impossible, to 
manage.22 This arises from the fact that whilst complexity makes risk unpredictable and it 
therefore needs to be controlled by dencentralized approaches, such tight coupling requires a 
centrally designed control system in order to react quickly to problems. The fate of Arthur 
Andersen, it is further argued, could well be regarded as such an unpredictable systems failure 
in a relatively tightly coupled and complex system.23
Explanations to why Risk has become so important
Risk as an organising principle
In considering the features that  make risk such a vital  tool for regulation,  Rothstein et  al 
conclude  that  ….”risk  provides  an organizing  concept  for  societal  decision-making  under 
uncertainty and is a key characteristic of modernity….as regulatory systems attempt to control 
events that have formerly been beyond control,  the process of decision-making transforms 
those events into risks as a way of rationally managing the limits of regulation.”24
As well  as  a  means  of  describing  what  constitutes  the  subjects  of  regulation  and related 
institutional threats, risk is increasingly being perceived as a procedure for the organisation of 
regulatory activities.25 
17   ibid at page 142
18  Reasons for this are attributed to factors which may influence public’s perceptions of risks. These 
include the degree of personal control over the size or probability of the risk, familiarity with the risk, degree 
of perceived equity in sharing risks and benefits and voluntariness with which the risk is undertaken. Ibid at 
page 141
19  ibid. However it is also added that such focus on individuals may downplay the degree to which 
perceptions are affected by a group, institutional and cultural factors.
20  ibid at 143
21  Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 62
22  Andersen TJ Perspectives on Strategic Risk Management (2006) Copenhagen Business School Press at 
page 101
23  ibid at pages 101 and 102; However, though the Andersen culture was dysfunctional, neither the culture 
nor the structure of Andersen was considered to be significantly different from that of the other big 
accountancy firms; for more this, see ibid
24  Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 99
25  ibid at page 97
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The utilisation of risk as a strategic organising principle is considered to be related to specific 
government needs26 and could also be argued to be linked to governmentality theory through 
the way in which risk is used as a tool of governance to shape regulatory behaviours.
The embeddedness of risk in regulation
The increasing connection between risk and regulation is apparent.27 Such fact is collaborated 
by the transformation  of  internal  controls  to  risk management.28 It  is  maintained  that  the 
transformation  of  risk  into  internal  controls  is  required  for  the  operation  of  risk-based 
regulation,  which  in  turn  would  facilitate  the  functioning  of  the  risk management  state.29 
According to Rothstein30 et al, the incorporation of risks in regulatory processes has taken 
place in two ways namely:  Through a quantitative process whereby risk analysis  and risk 
management  methods  are  increasingly  being  utilised  in  the  regulation  of  “traditional  and 
novel” risks, such risks being referred to as “societal risks”31.
The second mode of incorporation involves the “qualitative shift towards the management of 
institutional risks”.32 There has been an increased focus on the risks of risk management.33 
Such consequence of risk management has been referred to as the “duality of risk”.34
However, the ever increasing inter connectedness between risk and regulation does not mean 
that  both perfectly correspond to one another.35 This has given rise to compliance related 
issues for organisations.
Developments in corporate governance
In  its  White  Paper  on  European  governance  of  April  2001,36 the  European  Commission 
defines governance as “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised  at  [the]  European  level,  particularly  as  regards  openness,  participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence”. In 2006, priorities37 were arranged by the EU 
26  see Gray and Hamilton at page 5
27  Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
pages 50-58
28  Also see ibid at page 24
29  ibid 
30  Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G“A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics 
of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 92
31  ibid
32  ibid; institutional risks are implied to include risks encountered by institutions which are responsible for 
managing and regulating societal risks and/or legitimacy risks (to their rules and practices) - regardless of 
whether these institutions are state or non state institutions.
33  ibid;  See  also  Power  M,  The  Risk  Management  of  Everything:  Rethinking  the  Politics  of  
Uncertainty2004  Demos  at  pages  50-58  in  which  Power  argues  that  reliance  on  internal  controls  may 
increase risk if it leads to an undermining of the knowledge of risk in other areas; despite the benefits of risk 
management, concerns are generated due to the fact that secondary risk management has become an accepted 
“organisational  common  sense”  -  reflecting  the  society’s  loss  in  faith  in  its  professions  and  public 
organisations.
34  ibid and also see Ciborra C, ‘Digital Technologies and the Duality of Risk’(2004) CARR Discussion 
Paper No 27, CARR, LSE London
35  See Hutter B and Power M “Risk Management and Business Regulation” at page 2
36 See European Commission, “ European Governance: A White Paper” COM (2001) 428 final <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf > (last visited 13 December 2010)
37  Including shareholders’ rights and obligations, internal control, the modernization and simplification of 
European company law.
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Commission for “Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
EU”.38 That  same  year,  8  corporate  governance  principles  were  issued  by  the  Basel 
Committee.39 
Corporate governance tools are considered to be risk management strategies for the distinctive 
risk of failure by senior management to prevent the growth and development of risk.40 Modern 
risk management strategies have arisen from new institutions involved in the collection and 
statistical analysis of data required for activities like the census.41
In  his  speech  to  the  Institute  of  Chartered  Secretaries  and  Administrators  (ICSA)  EU 
Corporate  Governance  Summit,  Charles  McCreevy,  European  Commissioner  for  Internal 
Market and Services, highlighted the fact that it was apparent that:42
“poor, indeed, sometimes disastrous, risk management by financial institutions was partly to 
blame for the current financial turmoil. Risk management should be part of the strategy of the 
firm,  and indeed  the  culture  of  the  organisation.  It  is  the  duty  of  senior  management  in 
financial  institutions  to  address this  and it  is  the role  of the board to  oversee it.  In  their 
respective roles, both senior management and the board need to ensure a holistic approach to 
firm-wide – and group-wide -risk management.”
He  did  not  elaborate  on  how  a  firm’s  internal  risk  management  strategy  could  be  best 
integrated but indicated the area which was likely to serve as an early indicator of faults in a 
firm’s management system, namely, the firm’s approach to transparency.43
1.3 Risk Theories
Risk society
The  theme  of  evolutionism  is  common  to  various  theories  of  ‘simple’  modernisation.44 
However, a  different perspective is observed by Beck who views risks and unpredictability as 
the consequences of developments of science and industry.45 Furthermore, he argues that no 
one can be brought to book for unpredictable events in the “risk society”.46 Furthermore, the 
ability of regulators to regulate successfully depends on the level of efficiency and coherence 
of  “institutionally  complex  regulatory regimes”,  hence  the  limited  ability  of  regulators  to 
38  Mallin C, Corporate Governance 2007 Oxford University Press at page 35
39  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking 
Organisations” February 2006 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf?noframes=1>
40  Power M, Organized Uncertainty: Designing A World of Risk Management 2007 Oxford University 
Press at page 10
41  ibid at page 12
42  See European Commission, Address by Charlie McCreevy at the Institute Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators (ICSA) EU Corporate Governance Summit Brussels, 8 October 
2008<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/08/518&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>
43  ibid
44  See Beck U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications at page 2. Such 
theories range from those of Habermas to Max to Parsonian sociology.
45  ibid at page 2
46  ibid; In contrast to societal risks, Rothstein et al maintain that it is much easier to account for 
institutional risks through the transformation of behaviours and outcomes that could not be recorded 
previously or were considered to be acceptable. See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk 
Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 96
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control  societal  risks.47 In  Beck’s  view,  modernization  must  become  reflexive  and  such 
modernization not only involves structural change, but a dynamic relationship between social 
structures and social agents.48 Along with others, Beck argues that risks of late modernity 
differ  in  type  and  magnitude  from  those  which  previously  existed.49  Furthermore  they 
maintain that, in the ‘risk society’ in which we now live, risks are no longer imposed from 
external sources but are ‘manufactured’ as “products of mankind’s decisions, options, science, 
politics, industries, markets and capital.”50
Cultural Theory
Cultural theorists on the other hand, argue that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural 
preferences.51 However, it is argued that it is highly unlikely that cultural theory would be 
able to predict risk perceptions in particular situations.52 Furthermore, Ottedal et al maintain 
that  cultural  theory’s explanatory ability to explain how people perceive and act upon the 
world  around  them  may  easily  be  overestimated.53 Cultural  theory  proceeds  with  the 
assumption that a culture consists of persons which hold one another mutually to account. 54 
There is an attempt by such persons to live at a level of being held accountable, which is 
identical to a level at which such a person would want to hold others accountable.55 From this 
perspective, culture is ladened with political implications of mutual accountability.56 Rather 
than the perception that an isolated individual would check every piece of information in such 
a manner devoid of prejudice or moral commitment, the person is perceived to investigate 
possible information “through a collectively constructed censor set  to a given standard of 
accountability.” Since assimilated knowledge or the rejection of “mere noise” is based on a 
criterion which considers whether the new conception or fact will consolidate the subject’s 
preferred political scheme, in Douglas’ opinion, it would be fruitless to undertake a study of 
risk perception without a systematic consideration of cultural preferences.57
Governmentality approach to risk
The “governmentality” theory is related to the work of Foucault.58 According to his approach, 
risk  is  generally  considered  to  be  a  concept  which  is  socially  produced  in  its  entirety.59 
Furthermore, no external environment compels society to respond to risk.60 A broader view of 
47  ibid at page 95
48  ibid
49  See Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 94
50  Also see Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 
Oxford University Press at page 141
51  ibid at 142
52  Ottedal S, Moen B, Klempe H and Rundow T ‘Explaining Risk Perception: An evaluation of Cultural 
Theory’ < http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Psychometric_paradigm.pdf>
53  ibid at pages 5 and 6
54  Douglas M, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1994) Routlegde at page 31
55  ibid
56  ibid
57  ibid at pages 31 and 32
58  See Foucault M, ‘Governmentality’ in Burchell G et al (eds), The Foucault Effect at pages 87-104, also 
Bratich J, Packer J and McCarthy C Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality (2003) State University 
of New York Press 
59  See Zinn J, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 4
60  ibid
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government, which the notion of governmentality embraces, can be found in Mitchell Dean’s 
definition of government:
“Government  is  any more  or less calculated and rational  activity,  undertaken by a 
multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms 
of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, 
interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively 
unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes”.61
Theory of Risk Colonisation
This  theory  is  founded on  the  dynamic  linkage  between  societal  and  institutional  risks  - 
thereby  paving  the  way  for  a  new  explanatory  model  of  “contemporary  regulatory 
development” which recommends a research schedule for the study of the separate fields of 
risk and regulation.62 It is also an attempt to explain what is considered to be some of the 
“conceptual consequences” of efforts aimed at regulating risk.63
Criticism which revolves round Beck’s concept of risk is namely, that risk is too restricted in 
accounting for complexities involving governmental risk strategies and rationalities or socio 
cultural  perceptions  and  responses  to  risk.64 A  wider  approach  which  is  in  line  with  the 
concept  of  reflexive  modernization  commences  with  uncertainty  instead  of  risk.65 The 
distinction between risk and uncertainty is as follows: Risk is traditionally associated with 
probability  calculation  and  this  suggests  that  an  event  can  be  predicted  and  controlled.66 
Uncertainty however is not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities incapable of 
calculation which are based on guesswork and judgment.67 It is also added that uncertainty has 
to be defined acknowledging the possibility of unpredictable outcomes rather than adopting 
an approach which aims to transform uncertainty into certainty.68
The functionalist view on risk, that is those works which are frequently related to those of 
Douglas and Wildavsky, is principally criticised for its oversimplified interpretation of quite 
complicated and ever changing processes  of how risk is approached.69 The ‘socio-cultural’ 
approach and ‘risk culture’ try to address the functionalist view on risk by targeting more 
complex and changing processes which involve risk in every day life.70 One advantage of 
these approaches is namely, that responses to risk are generated.71
61  See Bennett T‘Culture and Governmentality’ in McCarthy C and Packer J (eds) Foucault, Cultural Studies 
and Governmentality 2003) State University of New York Press at page 47; Dean M, Governmentality.  
Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999) London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage 1999 at page 11
62  Rothstein et al at page 107
63  ibid at page 108
64  See Zinn J, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 1
65  ibid, also see W Bonss, Vom Risiko: Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit in der Moderne (1995) Hamburg: 
Hamburger Edition
66 Gray J and Hamilton J, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice  (2006) 20
67 ibid
68  see See Zinn J, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 2
69  ibid at page 3
70  ibid
71  ibid
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1.4 Quantification of Risks
The focus placed on the quantification of risks in various jurisdictions, varies according to the 
degree to which the decision making processes are subject to legal challenge and review, and 
whether there has been a tradition of independent regulatory agencies.72 
In order to overcome the myths surrounding the quantification and control of risks, “risks 
must be made auditable and governable.”73 In the attempt to make risk auditable,  the role 
assumed by risk management has been transformed to that which is synonymous with that of 
an appropriately managed organisation which is internally and externally in control of the way 
it “handles” uncertainty.74
Since societal risks are difficult to quantify, it could be argued that focus should be placed on 
preventing, detecting and rectifying the effects of institutional risks. Moreover, societal risks 
(excluding those risks attributed to “force majeure”), it can be argued, are consequential of 
the systemic effects of institutional risks. Hence the control of the source (that is, institutional 
risks) would be an effective way of containing the uncontrollable effects of societal risks.75 
Risk  management  of  institutional  risks,  even  though  this  generates  risks  (which  are  the 
consequence of an omission of other significant risks), can be undertaken using the audit risk 
model – especially since the assessment of risks, based on differences in perceptions76, is so 
subjective.
Successful management of institutional risks is dependent on many factors, namely, accuracy 
– inaccurate assessments of societal risks may further exacerbate the difficulty in managing 
institutional risks.77 Furthermore,  methodological challenges and the degree to which other 
decision shaping factors are aligned the success of risk management, also contribute to the 
effectiveness of the management of institutional risks.78 Even where institutional risks which 
72  Rothstein H, Huber Mand Gaskell G ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics 
of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 101
73  See Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos 
at page 10; also see U Beck, Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992)
74  Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 40
75  Whilst Power has argued that societal and institutional risk management are closely related, Rothstein et 
al contend that institutional risk management is stimulated by the ‘residual failures of societal risk 
management’ and that a focus on institutional risk management could also define the perception and 
management of societal risks. In other words, they emphasize the importance of concentrating not only on the 
management of societal risks, but also on the management of institutional risks. See Rothstein H, Huber M 
and Gaskell G ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and 
Institutional Risk at page 103
76  Attitudes to risk vary with individuals and may be different at different levels of an organization. “Risk 
attitudes or appetites may also vary across different aspects of the same risk, may in reality not correspond to 
any stated appetite and may change with new or better information.” See Power M, The Risk Management of  
Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty 2004 Demos at pages 19 and 20. Also see Hutter B, Risk 
and Regulation (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press
77  Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory 
Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 101
78  ibid
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emanate from the government and the judiciary are successfully managed through risk based 
procedures, there may still be exposure to institutional risks from external sources.79
The audit risk model not only requires the auditor to have an understanding of the client’s 
business and industry,  systems used in processing transactions,  qualifications of personnel 
engaged  in  accounting  procedures,  policies  related  to  preparation  of  client’s  financial 
statements but also requires that auditors have a knowledge of company’s internal controls.80
Traditional auditing techniques involve auditors performing tests to find out the level of risks 
which may exist in an entity. These risks consist of three components namely: inherent risks, 
control risks and detection risks and they all contribute to the audit risk81.  The audit risk 
models is denoted by the following equation:
 AR  =  IR  *  CR*DR  (where  AR  represents  audit  risk,  IR  represents  inherent  risk,  CR 
represents control risk and DR represents detection risk)
Inherent risks82 are those risks which emanate as a result of the nature of the business entity, 
control  risks83 are  those  risks  resulting  from reliance  on the  internal  controls  functioning 
within the business whilst detection risk is the risk that the auditor would not be able to detect 
material misstatements during procedures aimed at detecting such.
Inherent and control risks are outside the control of  auditors and since these risks are outside 
auditors' control, the consequence is that the higher the assessed levels of inherent and control 
risk, the lower the detection risk must be if the desired overall level of audit risk is to be 
achieved.84 The level of detection risk can be varied through auditors increasing substantive 
procedures,  that  is  statistical  sampling.85 Substantive   procedures  are  usually  costly  and 
auditors who place reliance on the internal controls in order to support the reduced use of 
substantive procedures need to show that the assessed level of control risk is low.86 This is 
done through the performance of tests  of controls.  Where internal  control weaknesses are 
discovered, this does not necessarily mean that more tests of control should be performed. 
Where performance of such tests of control would not be potentially cost-effective, the use of 
predominantly  substantive  procedures  is  recommended  straightaway.87 A  preliminary 
determination of the control risk is required where there is potential for cost effectiveness. If 
this pre determined risk is high, then a predominantly  substantive approach is recommended. 
If the control risk is low, then test of the internal controls are to be performed to confirm the 
preliminary assessment of control risk. Following confirmation of a low pre determined level 
of control risk, a reduced level of substantive procedures can then be carried out.88 
79  ibid at 102
80   ‘The Audit Risk Model’ http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf<> at pages 175,176 (last 
visited 14 Decemebr 2010); also see <http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF> 
page 5 of 20
81 This is defined as the probability that an auditor may unknowingly fail to adjust an opinion which is 
materially misstated in the financial statements; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report on Financial Statement 
Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges  (2002) page p 38
82 Inherent risk can also be defined as the susceptibility of an account balance to material error; ibid p 38
83 Risk that error could occur and not be prevented or detected by internal controls
84 See  Cosserat G, 'Audit Strategy'  1 February 1999, 
<http://www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/49870>
85 ibid
86 ibid
87 ibid
88 See  Cosserat G, 'Audit Strategy'  1 February 1999, 
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Materiality is provided for in the audit risk model as auditors are not required to account for 
every  misstatement  within  a  financial  statement  –  only  material  misstatements  need  be 
accounted for.89 Furthermore, the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures is vital to the 
model.  Auditors are also required to ascertain  “fraud risks” which take into consideration 
qualities of both inherent and control risk.90
Whilst according to some, the audit risk model has been relatively successful, its focus on 
internal  use has been said to  contribute  to  the existence  of  inherent  problems in  external 
procedures.91 This  was  soon  highlighted  in  a  study  on  expectations  gap,  following  its 
introduction.92
The audit risk model is prone to a number of limitations in that it does not account for certain 
risks which the auditor is exposed to. Examples of such risks include loss or injury to their 
professional  practice from litigation,  adverse publicity or other  events which relate  to the 
audited financial statements.93 Those risks which are not accounted for within the audit risk 
model are generally referred to as “engagement risk”, “client risk” or “client continuance (or 
acceptance) risk”94.
Furthermore,  the  definition  of  audit  risk  does  not  consider  the  risk  that  the  auditor  may 
mistakenly deduce that financial statements are materially misstated.95 Where such situation 
arises, the auditor simply makes a re consideration or extends audit procedures with requests 
that specific tasks be performed by management to re evaluate the relevance of the financial 
statements.96 
1.5 Avoiding the Risks of Risk Management
Power argues that to move beyond such “risk management driven privatization of the public 
sphere”, a new idea of risk which incorporates types of leadership at state, regulatory and 
corporate levels, and which is able to develop a language of risk, understood by the public and 
which expressly allows for the possibility of failure without this being understood as a way of 
“passing the buck”, will be required.97
“Soft management systems” which are able to address uncertainties need to be designed and a 
balance should be struck between the role of calculative methods and other softer forms such 
as images and normative.98
<http://www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/49870>
89  Also see ‘The Audit Risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf > at page 
177
90  ibid
91  Andersen TJ, ‘Perspectives on Strategic Risk Management’ (2006) Copenhagen Business School Press 
Denmark at pages 95 and 96
92  ibid
93  See AICPA, 'Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an 
Audit'<http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF> page 2 of 20
94  ‘The Audit Risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf > at page 177
95   See AICPA, 'Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit' 
<  http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF  > page 2 of 20  
96  ibid
97  see Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty (2004) 
Demos at pages 57 and 58
98  ibid at page 50
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In Power’s view, the problems relating to the use of quantitative techniques for risk, namely, 
that of ‘duality of risk’, which embodies Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
should not restrict its application where appropriate.99 He however adds that there is need for a 
“second order intelligence” in organizations which implement such techniques.100
“Calculative solutions to technical problems work well in situations where there is an 
available  database which is  large,  clearly  defined and complete,  and where a high 
degree of organizational  and political  consent about the nature of the ‘risk object’ 
exists.”101
‘Intelligent  risk management’  is  considered to  be a balance between the role assumed by 
calculative  techniques  and models  and other  forms  which  are  inclusive  of  narratives  and 
images.102
Justifying regulatory decisions
According  to  Baldwin  and  Cave,  risk  regulators  encounter  problems  with  the  search  for 
legitimation as a result of differences between the lay and experts’ perceptions of risk.103  In 
order to justify their regulatory decisions, given the differences in perceptions in particular, 
two responses based on an expertise rationale and on the accountability, due process rationale 
are  advanced.104 Stephen  Breyer’s  illustration  of  the  expertise  approach  is  provided  by 
Baldwin and Cave who argue that the difficulty with his suggestion stems from the fact that it 
focuses on legitimation through expertise  at  the expense of legitimation through focus on 
democratic policy-making, accountability and due process through participatory means.105
In Breyer’s view, regulation of significant health risks is affected by three serious problems 
which  result  in  a  “vicious  circle”.106 Not  only  do  these  problems  undermine  the  trust  in 
regulatory institutions, they also increasingly prevent greater rational regulation.107 Causes of 
such  problems  are  attributed  to  public  perceptions,  statutory  actions  and  reactions  and 
uncertainties in the technical  regulatory process.108 As a way of resolving these problems, 
institutional changes which reflect the opinion that a “depoliticised regulatory process might 
produce  better  results”  would  be  required.109 Baldwin  and  Cave  contrast  the  approach 
99  ibid at page 54
100  ibid
101  ibid
102  ibid at page 55. In developing an “intelligent risk management” strategy, three essential criteria are 
listed, namely that, such strategy:
- Should not permit control systems to dominate the focus of management and bodies which are deemed 
to be independent by virtue of the exercise of their functions
- Should be characterized by learning and experiment rather than rule based processes and
- That however, a balance should be struck between the need to focus on internal controls and the 
admission of rules based processes and that managers should have the ability to question the formal 
risk management system.
103  see Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 145
104  ibid
105  ibid at 146
106  ibid; See also Breyer S, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Towards Effective Risk Regulation (1993) 
Cambridge Mass. at page 33
107  ibid
108  ibid
109  also Breyer S, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Towards Effective Risk Regulation (1993) Cambridge Mass. 
At page 56
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advanced by Breyer to that of Shrader-Frechette. In their view, Shrader-Frechette’s approach, 
as a means of legitimation, is significant.110 Furthermore, its support for the stance that risk 
analyses must be carried out within framework of greater “participation and accountability” – 
which can be contrasted with Breyer’s focus on expertise, contribute to its significance.111
Regulatory Developments in the European Union
Regulatory  failures  in  EU  member  states,112 public’s  preference  for  risk  aversion  and 
increased EU regulatory powers are developments which are considered to have played a part 
in determining the current regulatory direction of the EU.113 Three developments which have 
controversially resulted in the present systemic approach to risk analysis in the EU include 
some  high  profile  risk  management  failures  at  the  national  level  and  apparent  lack  of 
interaction between the national and EU level; the governance crisis at the EU level and the 
growing dependence by the EU on the precautionary principle.114 
Hedge Funds and their Significance in Risk Regulation
The European Commission’s Consultation Document on Hedge Funds115 should contribute to 
“a consideration of the appropriateness of existing approaches to regulation and supervision 
of the hedge funds sector.” In terms of assets which are managed by the global fund industry, 
hedge funds have increased 50 times since 1990.116 Recently,  trading by hedge funds has 
constituted more than 50% of the daily trading volume in equities markets.117 The impact of 
activities of highly leveraged investment vehicles on the stability of the financial system, in 
addition to perceived lack of transparency of hedge funds, has contributed to concerns over 
hedge funds.118 On a global basis, hedge fund related assets attained a maximum level of $2 
trillion in 2007.119
110  See Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at pages 147 and 148; also see K S Schrader-Frechette Risk and Rationality 1991(Berkeley, 
California) 
111  ibid at 148
112  For example, the UK’s BSE crisis and the Belgian dioxin crisis
113  Van Calster G ‘Risk Regulation, EU Law and Emerging Technologies: Smother or Smooth?’ 
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/q14jn1284r4585gg/fulltext.pdf> (last visited 14 December 2010) page 
2 of 11
114  ibid at page 3; A standardized version of the precautionary principle states that “[w]hen an activity raises 
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” See Ahteensuu M‘Defending the 
Precautionary Principle Against Three Criticisms” < http://www.kirj.ee/public/trames/ref-tr-07-4-3.htm>at 
page 1 of 16 (last visited 15 December 2010); for further definitions also see Morris J, Rethinking Risk and 
the Precautionary Principle 2000 Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann at page 1
115  Whose period of consultation was between 18.12.2008 and 31.01.2009
116  European Commission, “Working Document of the Commission Services (DG Internal Market): 
Consultation Paper on Hedge Funds” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/consultation_paper_en.pdf> at page 2
117  ibid
118  ibid
119  Based on the IMF’s estimates, average fund leverage is between 1.4 and 1.7 times capital; ibid
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Three of the questions which constitute the focus of the Consultation Document and which 
are relevant to the purposes of this paper, along with responses to these questions, will be 
discussed.120
The questions are as follows:121
Does recent experience require a reassessment of the systemic relevance of hedge funds?122
“Is the 'indirect regulation' of hedge fund leverage through prudential requirements on prime
brokers still sufficient to insulate the banking system from the risks of hedge fund failure? Do 
we need alternative approaches?123
120  The respondents to these questions consisted of 11 individuals, 80 organisations and 18 public authorities.
121  See European Commission, “Internal Market and Services DG : DG Market Services Working Document, 
Feedback Statement , Summary of Responses to Hedge Fund Consultation 
Paper”<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/feedback_statement_en.pdf>
122  ibid at page 9 of 18
123  See ibid at page 10 of 18
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Up till now, regulatory focus has been directed towards ensuring that bankruptcy relating to 
hedge funds, does not trigger further systemic crisis in other parts of the financial sector.124 
From the  responses  obtained,  a  significant  percentage  of  these  were  of  the  opinion  that 
adequate bank capitalization structures were in place to contain consequences of a hedge fund 
crisis.125 Furthermore, the results not only revealed that prime brokers were equipped with risk 
management tools which would shield them from counter party risks, but that respondents 
also  considered  the  prudential  requirements  to  which  prime  brokers  were  subject,  to  be 
stringent.126
In relation to indirect regulation, criticism was directed not only at its inability to account for 
the fact that different hedge funds may mimic each other’s procedures, but that they could 
also be similarly affected by common market developments.127
“Do prudential authorities have the tools to monitor effectively exposures of the core financial
system to hedge funds, or the contribution of hedge funds to asset price movements? If not,  
what types of information about hedge funds do prudential authorities need and how can it be
provided“128?
In order to improve transparency during its dealings with authorities, recommendations of a 
single, global registeration procedure for hedge funds and their managers, were put forward 
by  some  respondents.129 In  addition,  to  the  requirement  of  the  submission  of  periodic 
regulatory  reports  on  size,  investment  style,  exposures,  leverage  and  performance,  some 
124 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/feedback_statement_en.pdf
125  ibid
126  ibid; Many respondents also thought that banks’ risk assessment systems were robust enough to address 
counter party risks – even though such responses were based on preliminary assessments. Due to the fact that 
credit, counter party and market risks could speedily materialize, some respondents considered further 
consolidation of prime broker management of hedge fund related risk as essential in limiting the possibilities 
of a systemic impact being triggered.
127  Ibid; It was proposed that the indirect prudential approach be bolstered by direct surveillance measures 
which would take into consideration external market effects
128  ibid at page 11 of 18
129  ibid at page 12 of 18
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respondents recommended that such process of information collection should involve hedge 
fund managers, as well as prime brokers, the valuator, the clearing broker or other prominent 
counter  parties  –  as  prudential  authorities  may not  possess  adequate  facilities  to  monitor 
effectively exposures of the financial system to hedge funds or its contribution to asset price 
movements.130
1.6 Conclusion
In explaining why risk has become so central  in governmental  and regulatory circles,  this 
paper has attempted to highlight the interconnected nature between risk and regulation and 
also  illustrate  how risk can  serve as  a  regulatory tool.  Conversely regulation,  if  properly 
implemented, should to an extent, be able to address the challenges posed by risk. Through its 
knowledge generating capacity, regulation could serve as a means of resolving challenges and 
problems  generated  by  risk.131 In  addition  to  the  recommendations  put  forward  in  the 
concluding section of this paper, a focus on institutional risks as well as hedge funds, the 
successful management of these – including those risks emanating from risk management, 
greater transparency measures, should assist regulators in addressing the challenges presented 
in regulating risk.
130  ibid
131 Rothstein H et al : A Theory of Risk Colonization at page 95
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